1. To the First Question

42. I reply therefore in a different way to these questions.

To the first. - Because we chiefly take the idea of the word from Augustine’s book On the Trinity, certain definite things must be supposed that according to him belong to the word;a from these we must investigate what in the intellect they most belong to, and that thing must be set down as the word.

a [Interpolation] and second these things are by division to be removed from everything that is not the word (as the Philosopher does in Ethics 2.5.1105b19-06a13 when inquiring into the genus of virtue, where he divides the things in the soul into powers, passions, and habits); third, when those things have been removed that do not belong to what is being investigated.

43. The word according to himb is not without actual cognition, as is plain from ibid. XV ch.15 n.25.

b [Interpolation] it is an act of intelligence, as is plain by comparing the trinity he posits in ibid. IX to the trinity that he posits in ibid. X (for knowledge corresponds to intelligence). Also the word...

44. Also the word is generated from memory or from science, or from the object shows itself in the science, as is plain from ibid. XV ch.10 n.19: “The word is thought formed from the thing we know;” ch.14 n.24: “Our word is born from our science in the way the word of God the Father is born by science alone.” And all these things are the same, because according to ibid. IX ch.12 n.18: “from the knower and known together knowledge is born,” which two things are one integral cause with respect to generated knowledge, as was said in distinction 3 question 2 n.494.a

a A blank space was left here by Scotus

45. Third, the word is investigated by him because of the image [sc. of the Trinity] in the mind and is set down as the second part of the image (namely the offspring), as is plain from ibid. IX ch.32: “There is a certain image of the Trinity; the mind itself, and its knowledge (which is its offspring and its word from itself), and love third.”

46. The word may therefore be described as: the word is an act of intelligence produced by perfect memory, not having existence without actual intellection, representing the divine word (because for this reason Augustine inquired into our word).

47. From these it is plain that the word is nothing pertaining to the will, nor to memory (because the word is the second part of the image, not the first or third), and consequently it is not the intelligible species nor the habit, nor anything pertaining to memory; it is therefore something pertaining to intelligence.

a. Which of the Things Found in the Intelligence is the Word

48. Now in the intelligence there seems only to be [1] actual intellection, [2] or the object that is the term of that intellection, or, according to others, [3] the species generated in the intelligence from the species in the memory, which ‘species in the intelligence’ precedes the act of understanding, or, according to others, [4] it is something formed by an act of understanding, or fifth, according to others, [5] intellection itself as a passion, as if caused by itself as action; and according to these five there can be five opinions about the word.

49. Now the species in the intelligence is not prior to the act of understanding [contra the third opinion], because positing such a species is superfluous. For it does not more perfectly represent the object than the species in the memory, and it is enough to have one thing perfectly representing the object before the act of understanding.

50. But that it is not ‘more perfect’ is plain from Augustine ibid. XV ch.14 n.23: “There is nothing more in the offspring than in the parent.”

51. Also in that case two species of the same idea would be in the same power, because these two species are of the same power; and the intellect itself as memory and intelligence is one power, because it is pure act, and that by which the possessor operates and that by which it has first act is in second act.

52. In that case too the habit would not be the immediate principle of the act, nor would what has the habit be in accidental power to acting according to the habit, because a prior form would be required for the operation, different from the habit.

53. Nor can the ‘species in the intelligence’ be posited as being born naturally, supposing it could never exist without actual intellection, because actual intellection is subject to the command of the will; nor even can it be said that it is born freely or that its generation is subject to the command of the will - as it seems - if it is posited as a species prior to act, because it seems that the first thing pertaining to the intellect that is in our power is actual intellection.

54. Nor can the object itself be posited as the word, as another opinion says [the second, n.48], because the object in itself is not anything produced by virtue of memory (or of anything in the mind), such as the word is, - nor is the object ‘as it is in the memory’ produced by virtue of the memory, as is plain; but the object ‘as it is in the intelligence’ is only generated because something is first generated in which the object has being, because, as was said in distinction 3 nn.375, 382, 386, these intentional actions and passions do not belong to the object save because of some real action or passion that belongs to that in which the object has intentional being.

55. Nor too is it some term produced by intellection [sc. the fourth opinion, n.48], because intellection is not the productive action of any term; for then it would be incompossible to understand it to exist and not to be of the term, just as it is incompossible to understand that there is heating and no heat toward which the heating exists. But it is not impossible to understand intellection in itself without understanding that it is of some term as produced by it.

56. There is a confirmation too, that such operations ought to be ultimate acts, from Ethics 1.1.1094a3-5 and Metaphysics 9.8.1050a-b1. - This matter was spoken about above in distinction 3 nn.600-604, as to how it is a certain action of the genus of action, and another action that is quality, of which sort intellection is.

57. This way - and the following one about intellection-passion - are also refuted [sc. the fourth and fifth opinions, n.48] through the same middle term, that then the intelligence and not the memory would generate the word, which is contrary to Augustine [n.44]; for intelligence would produce the term of the action of understanding, if there were any - and intelligence would produce intellection-passion, if there were any.

58. Also this way ‘about intellection-action and passion’ [the fifth] does not seem reasonable, because intellection is one form, which although it can be compared to the agent from which it is and to the subject in which it is received, yet it does not have from it such distinction that it could be as it were the cause of itself or the term of action in accord with this [sc. the subject] and not in accord with that [sc. the agent]; because if it is the term of action, this is in accord with itself, and not in accord with this respect or that, but those respects are concomitants of it.

59. It follows,     therefore , by way of division that the word is actual intellection [the first opinion, n.48].

60. And there is confirmation from Augustine On the Trinity XV ch.16 n.23: “Our thinking, reaching to that which we know, and formed from it, is our word.” The same is held by him in ibid. ch.10 n.19: “Formed thinking, indeed,” etc     . “is the word,” as was said above [n.44].

61. There is confirmation of this through a likeness about the vocal and imaginable word: for the vocal word is formed to signify and make clear what is understood, but that a vocal sound is not at once formed by someone who understands insofar as he understands but through some other middle power (namely a motive one), this belongs to imperfection; if therefore it were generated or formed at once as expressive of that which is latent in the intellect, and this by virtue of the understanding intellect, it would no less be the word. Now the object lies habitually latent in the memory; if therefore by virtue of it is at once caused some actual intellection, which once generated expresses and makes clear the object latent there, - truly it is the word, because expressive of what is latent and generated by virtue of it to express it.

b. Whether any Actual Intellection at all is the Word

62. But a further doubt remains, whether any actual intellection at all is the word.

63. [Opinions of others] - To this a reply is given in the negative, and that one must add - as a specific difference - ‘intellection which is declarative’ [n.11].

64. I argue against this because in the Father there is declarative knowledge formally, - for the intellection that is in the Father ‘insofar as he is intelligence’ is declarative of the Father ‘insofar as he is memory’, and thus perfectly, just as actual intellection ‘as it is in the Son’ declares habitual knowledge as it is in the memory of the Son; but in the Father there is not the word formally, as will be said in the solution of the question [n.71].

65. Likewise, the word declares itself, according to Augustine On the Trinity VII ch.3 n.4: “If,” he says, “this word that we pronounce is temporal and manifests both itself and that of which we speak, how much more does the word of God etc.” and manifest itself? ‘To declare’ then does not state a real relation, nor consequently the relation of what is generated; but the word is nothing but generated intellection (ibid. IX ch.12 n.18), otherwise it could be posited formally in the Father.

66. A reply is also given in another way as concerns this article [n.62], that the word is actual knowledge ‘that is the term of inquiry’.

67. This is shown from Augustine ibid. when he says that the word is a thing born or an offspring; but it is a thing born because it is a thing found, - but it is not a thing found save because it is inquired into; hence Augustine means that this thing born of the mind is preceded by an appetite moving to inquiry.

68. He seems to mean the same in ibid. XV ch.15 n.25 when he inquires as follows: “Then a true word comes to be when that which I said to us ‘spreads with a certain rapid motion’ comes to that which we know and is thence formed, taking on its likeness in every way, so that in whatever way each thing is known so too is it thought;” this ‘rapid thinking’ is inquiry, of the sort that will not exist in the fatherland, as he indicates [ch.41 or 16]: “Perhaps there will not be rapid thoughts there.”

69. The position then is that after confused knowledge there follows inquiry and argumentation, and finally one reaches perfect knowledge, which is as it were generated by that inquiry; and the perfect knowledge, which is the term of inquiry, is the word.

70. Against this I argue as follows: if it belongs to the idea of the word that ‘it is born through inquiry’, then God does not have a word; second, in that case an angel does not have a word about things naturally known to him; third, then the blessed do not have a word about the divine essence, nor about anything perfectly known without inquiry; fourth, therefore he who has the perfect habit of science and at once operates through the habit cannot have a word, - all which things seem absurd.

71. [Scotus’ own opinion] - Therefore, setting these opinions aside, I say as to this article [n.62] that not any actual intellection at all is the word (as was proved against the way that set down ‘declarative’ as proper to the word [nn.64-65]), but generated knowledge is; and therefore in the Father there is no word formally.

72. But any generated knowledge whatever - which Augustine calls offspring - is a word, though not in the way Augustine posits a perfect word, namely one that represents the divine word [nn.45-46].

73. I make clear the first of these [sc. that any generated knowledge is a word], because any actual intellection is generated from memory, imperfect from imperfect as perfect from perfect; therefore any knowledge is offspring and expressive of the parent, and is generated to express the parent. - And this is confirmed first from Augustine On the Trinity IX ch.10 n.15: “Everything known is said to be a word impressed on the mind, as long as it can be defined and produced from the memory;” again ibid. XV ch.12 n.22: “Nor does it matter when he who speaks what he knows learnt it; for sometimes as soon as he learns it he says it.” And briefly, whatever difference is found between the first generated imperfect knowledge and the knowledge that follows inquiry, there is no formal difference because of which the latter could be called word and the former not, as it seems.

74. I make the second clear [sc. not any generated knowledge is the perfect word, n.72], because our intellect does not immediately have perfect knowledge of the object, because according to the Philosopher Physics 1.1.184a16-23 what is inborn in us a way of proceeding from the confused to the distinct; and therefore first, in order of origin, there is impressed on us a confused knowledge of the object before a distinct one, - and therefore inquiry is necessary for our intellect to come to distinct knowledge; and therefore inquiry is necessary previous to the perfect word, because there is no perfect word unless there is perfect actual knowledge.

75. So then one must understand that when some object is known confusedly inquiry follows - by way of division - into the differences that belong to it; and when all the differences have been found, definitive knowledge of the object is perfect actual knowledge and is perfectly declarative of the habitual knowledge which was first in the memory; and this definitive knowledge, perfectly declarative, is the perfect word.

76. This is what Augustine says ibid. IX ch.10 n.15: “I define what temperance is, and this is its word;” and in the same place Augustine premises, in the same chapter, what he was already set down above: “as long as it can be defined and produced from the memory,” [n.73] - that is distinctly and definitively and actually known, by virtue of what is in the memory.

77. It does not     therefore belong to the idea of the word to be born after inquiry, but it is necessary for an imperfect intellect - which cannot at once have definitive knowledge of the object - to have such knowledge after inquiry; and therefore the perfect word does not exist in us without inquiry. And yet when a perfect word follows such inquiry, the inquiry is not the generation of the word itself formally, but is quasipreliminary to the word being generated; which Augustine well indicates in the afore cited authority [n.68] “hither and thither with a certain rapid motion” etc     . “when it comes to that which we know and is thence formed,” it is the word etc., - indicating that this scattering about (that is, inquiry) is not the generation of the word formally but is followed by the generation of the word from what we know, that is, form the object habitually known in the memory.

78. And if it be objected ‘for what then is inquiry necessary?’ - one can say to this that motion is necessary for the introduction of perfect form (which could not be introduced at the beginning of the motion), or there is introduction of many forms ordered to the introduction of the final form, and without that order of forms the final form could not be at once introduced. And accordingly this order is posited: first there is habitual confused knowledge, second confused actual intellection, third inquiry (and in inquiry there are many words from many habitual knowledges virtually contained in memory), which inquiry is followed by distinct and actual knowledge of the first object whose knowledge is being inquired into, - which ‘actual distinct’ knowledge impresses perfect habitual knowledge on memory, and then first there is perfect memory and it is likened to the memory in the Father; ultimately, from perfect memory is generated a perfect word, without inquiry coming between it and the word, - and this generation is likened to the generation of the perfect divine word, from perfect paternal memory. No word is perfect, then, representing the divine word (which is what Augustine is most investigating) save that which is born of perfect memory without inquiry coming between such memory and such word, although neither could that memory be had by us - because of the imperfection of our intellect - unless inquiry precede.

c. Whether Will Concurs in the Idea of the Word

79. The last doubt in this question [sc. question 1] is whether the will concurs in the idea of the word, - namely whether it belongs to its idea that it be generated voluntarily or by an agent will ‘joining the intelligence to memory’, according to what Augustine says in many places.

80. This question is moved by Augustine in On the Trinity IX ch.10 n.15: “Rightly,” he says, “is the question raised whether all knowledge is a word or only loved knowledge is;” and he replies: “Not everything words in any way touch upon is conceived, but some things are so in order only to be known and are yet not called words - as things that displease are said to be neither conceived nor brought to birth;” “in another way everything that is known is called a word, as long as it can be pronounced or defined from memory.” And afterwards he adds: “However, although the things we hate displease us, yet the knowledge of them does not displease us,” - such that it does not belong to the idea of the word that it is generated by love of the known object, nor does it even belong to the word to be born by love of the knowledge that is the word.

81. Yet there accompanies the perfect word a double act of will: one is previous, whereby the act and the previous inquiry are commanded without which the perfect word would not be reached (as is plain in ibid. IX ch.12 n.18), and the other is that in which the intellect rests in intelligible knowledge already possessed, without which the intellect would not persist in that knowledge. An act of will, therefore, is not of the essence of the word, neither formally nor as cause, but is necessarily concomitant with the generation of it in us because of previous inquiry into it and for continuing it; likewise because of the fact that the intellect - if the will is not well pleased in the knowledge - would not persist in it, and so this knowledge would not have the idea of permanent word. Yet this permanence is not of the idea of the perfection of the word intensively, because a whiteness of one day is not less perfect than a whiteness of one year; but the will that has regard to the object - of which there is a word - does not pertain to the idea of the word save when taking word strictly, the way Augustine takes it in the afore cited chapter [n.80], “No one can say ‘Lord Jesus’ save with the Holy Spirit” (this ‘saying’ includes acceptance of the said object and adds something beyond the idea of word absolutely).